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CHAPTER 'i 7 
Is Fair Market Value Just Compensation? 
An Underlying Issue Surfaced in Keto 
David L Callies, FA l er, ACREL 
Shelley Ross Saxer* 
I. Introduction 
Eminent domain ' is a power either granted or inherent in most general 
purpmc governments throughout the world.! The power to lake or re-
claim private property for governmental purposes is generally consid-
ered 10 be a natural attribute of sovereignty. However. mosl 
governmcnts-or the judicial branches thereof- require thai compuJ-
M>ry purchase not only be accomplished for some governmental or public 
purpose. but also thai the private landowner from whom the property is 
taken be fairly compensated for the loss. 
The concept of "jusl compensation" is typically measured by the 
faif market value of the property or intereM in properlY (easement. 
~easchold. \crvitude) taken by governmenl. Generally. fair market value 
1~ what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the property. 
While simple to slUte. the fair market value standard is not so easily 
applied in many situations. For example. what if government, through 
~ddi(ional regulation. acts to reduce the market value of property by 
limiting the number of legal uses available to the landowner just prior 
to government acquisition? What if government undertakes activity 
s.h~rt of such additional regulation through announcements and pub-
hCIIY which also has the effect of reducing the property's fair market 
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value? Or. what if the government's purpose in condemning private 
property i .. to a .. semble property for redevelopment by private entities 
in order to increase tax revenues? All of these scenarios may be en-
countered when local and stale government .. use eminent domain to 
promote the economic well-being of their communities through pri-
vate redevelopmcnt. 
A recent Supreme Coun case, Kefo l '. City of Nell' LOl/doll. con-
tained elemcllIs implicating the is .. ues surrounding just compen .. ation;l 
Though the'ic issues were not directly before the Court, the Kefo oral 
argument tran!>cript reflects the Justicc<;' concerns about valuation,~ 
Justice Kennedy asked, "Are there any writing .. or scholarship that 
indicate .. that when you have property being takcn from onc private 
person ultimately to go to another private person, that what we ought 
to 1I0 i .. to adjust the measure of compensation, .. 0 that the owner-the 
?'" l'ondemnee can rcceive some SOil of a premium for the developmenl. 
Scott G, Bullock, on behalf of the petitioner .. , agreed with Justice 
Kennedy's asscssment of current law; when value j:-. determined a court 
mu~t ignore the proposed project and instead pre .. ume "a willing buyer 
anti willing seller, without rererence to the project."/1 Ju:-.tice Kenncdy, 
howe,'cr, continued to queMion whethcr "there ha:-. been any scholar-
... hip to indicate that maybe Jthe just] compensation mca:-.ure ought to 
be adjusted when A i.., lOSing properly ror the economic benefit or B,"7 
Ncither petitioner nor respondent wa!\ ablc to re.!.pond efrectively (0 
Justice Kennedy's que .. tion about a premium cornpemation standard 
~hen private property i .. condemned for private economic benelit.~ Ju:-
tlce Kennedy rai\ed the i .. sue again when he stated, ·'It does seem iromc 
that 100 percent of the premium for the new development goes to ~he 
developer and to the taxpayer ... and not to the property owner:'\! Jusllce 
Breyer then underscored Justice Kennedy' .. point about compensation 
by a!\~lIlg. "II h there some way of assuring that the jU .. l compensation 
actually put.1the person in the po .. ition he would be in if he didn't have 
to .. ell ~is housc? Or is he inevitably WOf\e off?" 1I) Although the Justices 
recognlled that the rnea'>ure of compcnsation was not at is .. uc in the 
Kelo ca..,c, II sevcral of them were bOlhered by the problem of making 
the propcl1y OWner whole, I1 
In Kefo, the Unitcd States Supreme Court confirmed its adherence ll 
to th,c ~oldings in Berman \', Parker14 and Hmmii HOllsing Alit/writ)' 
\', Midkiff I ~ that the government may cxercbe its eminent domain power 
so long, as it i .. "rationally relmed to a conceivable public purpose:'11l 
Accordlll~ly •. the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment continucs 
to be of brnned assistance in protecting pri v31C properly rights,ll Jus-
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tice O'Connor in her dissent critici/cd the majority's reasoning as 
"w3sh[ingl out any distinction between private and public usc of prop-
erty-and thereby effectively ... delet[ingJ the words 'for public me' 
from the Takings Clause of thc Fifth Amendment."18 However, even 
prior to the Keto case, several commentators had encouraged using 
only the concept of just compensation to comrol government abuse of 
the eminent domain power.I9 
Thi ... chapler explores how jUM compensation is determined when 
redevelopmcnt projects utilize eminent domain for land assembly. In 
the Keto or .. 11 argument. Justice Breyer described the public's adverse 
reaction to such eminent domain action when ·'an individual hu.-'. a house 
and they want to ... not [bel made a lot worse off, at least not made a lot 
worse ofT just so some other people can get a lot more money:'1f) How-
ever. lustice Kennedy pointed oul lhat "a fundamental [rule) of con-
demnation law [isl that you can nOI value the property being taken ba\ed 
on what ii's going to be worth after the project"!1 
We begin by looking at this genera l rule of valuation and its appli-
cation in four different cases.!! We next address two major concerns 
that arise when the fundamenti.ll ru le is applied: I) precondemnation 
gO\ernmcnt act ion , whethcr done with thc intention of driving down 
compensation or not. may unfairly diminish the landowner's eventual 
compensation: i.lIld 2) the fair market value measure of compen!iation 
may 110t make the property owner whole. There are two exceptions to 
the general rule that attcmpt to address thc.<,e concerns: I) the \Cope of 
the project e,-ception if the condemned property is out..,ide the '!cope 
of the original project, i.Ind 2) the precondemnation blight exception 
where the government'" precondemnation actions intentionalJy reduce 
the property'" fair market value, entitl ing the owner to Klopping dam-
age ... )l Finally. we examine what components are taken inlo accou~t 
when valuing property that i!i being condemned to facilitate econo.mlc 
development by private entities and whether some type of.premlUm 
can be awarded when "A is losing property for the economiC benefit 
of B."~4 
II. General Rule Regarding the Effect on Valuation of 
Government's Intended or Actual Use 
As a general rule. when valuing land for condemnation. neither the 
government nor the propcrty owner may receive the benefit or the 
burden of the government's intended use.!!! The Supreme Court ex-
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plained III United SWleJ l'. ReYllolds that "to permit compensation to 
be either reduced or increased because of an alteration in the market 
value attributable to the project itself would nOl lead 10 the 'just com· 
pcn~ation' that the Constitution requires.'· ~6 Although the general rule 
was first created by common law, several states and the Model Emi-
nent Domain Code have codified the rule Y This section discusses 
four cases in which various courts applied the general rule to limit 
landowner recovery or Im.s by excluding the government'~ actual or 
intended usc. 
In State I'. SOI·jell, the state of Indiana sought to condemn a .75 
acre parcel and a 1.80 acre parcel of the Sovich's larger property to 
widen an interstate highway. l~ At trial, the state called an expert wit-
ness who "concluded that the future deve lopment would impair the 
value of the propeny as sites for modem service ~tation~. and that the 
highesl and heM use of the land would be a.!. commercial or industrial 
I;,ites."~ On cross-examination, however. the expert admilted that "his 
opinion, , , was partially based on the changes that would be brought 
about upon completion of the project for which appellees' property 
was being taken,"'!! The So\ich~ moved to strike and the trial court 
su!)taincd, 'I 
On appeal. the ~tate argued that a trial court may "consider, . , the 
decrease in market value occasioned by the same projeci for which it 
ir.; necessary to take the property in the first piace."u The Supreme 
~ourt noted that it had not considered thir.; "precise issue" before, but 
\I observed that "lilt is difficult to imagine a more specious argument 
Ithan the state\l."n According 10 the Court. adoption of the proposed 
ru~c would allow Slate or local government to dcpre~s property valu~s 
pnor t? condemnation: ·'If appellant's argument were adopted by thIS 
Court It would be a simple matter for any condemnor to depress prop· 
crty \'alues merely by publishing details of the planned project:' loI The 
Coun .supported ill;, concJu~ion by further noting that ·'!.he weight of 
authOTllY hold~ that neither an increase nor a decrease in the market 
value of the property sought to be taken. which is brought about by 
the s~me project for which the propeny b being taken, may be consid-
ered In ~etcrmining the value of the propcny."l~ 
In PledmolJl Triad Regiol/al Water Author;tl' v. UI/ger, the Pied-
mont Water Authority designated as water!o.he·d 94.1 t acreS of the 
Unger's larger property in August 1995. but waited until June 28. 
2000 to actually condemn approximately 19.513 acres of the larger 
94.11 acre parcel. ~ The COUrt in P;edmoru began by setting forth the 
general COlllmon law rule. which had been codified by the North 
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Carolina legislature: "'Itlhe value of the propeny taken ... does nOI 
include an increase or decrease in value before the date of valuation 
thai is caused by: (i) the proposed improvement or project for which 
the property i'> taken . :"n After articulating the general rule, the 
COurt held that the "[dJefendants [wereJ entitled 10 introduce evi-
dence of the property's value before Ihe development and density 
restrictions were adopted .... "18 
Similarly, in City of BOlllder 1'. Fowler Irrel'ocable Tnt'''. the city 
of Boulder designated as a noodway a portion of the trust's land. w 
Prior to the designation. the property had been zoned to allow some 
development on the property. After the designation. the property was 
rezoned to a classification that "essentially prohibited" developmenL.fO 
The trial court found that the change in zoning designation "was a 
direct result of Boulder's flood control projectl.j" and therefore the 
change should not affect the value of the property.41 The Colorado 
COUrt of Appeals affirmed, noting that "because the designations re-
ducing the value of the property resulted from the project for which 
the property was being taken. they could not be considered in valuing 
the propcflY."~~ 
In McAshtm I'. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp .. Delhi Corp. condemned 
a 3.36 acre parcel of plaintiff's larger 6.800 acre ranch for usc a~ a 
compressor station, meter loop, and road easement:'1 Prior to con-
demnation. plaintiff lIsed the parcel as a pasture. but introduced an 
expert witne~s at trial who "offered evidence of several leases of com-
pre.\sor site~ situated on ranches in the Isurrounding] area ... This 
evidence was offered 10 prove the value of the propeny taken and that 
the highe~t and best use of the property was as a compressor site ... "" 
!he is~ue on appeaJ was whether the leases were relevant to detemlin-
109 the value of the land for condemnation.4' 
The COurt set forth the general rule: "a condemnor should not be 
required to pay an enhanced value for property due to the placing of a 
public improvement on the property,"46 The condemnee argued ~hat 
the Court !!hould value the 3.36 acre parcel after considering the pIpe-
line compressor improvements because the parcel was not within "the 
~riginal scope of the project .... "~ 1 The scope of the project doclri.ne 
IS an exception to the general rule which allows a landowner to claim 
fair market value based on the enhanced value of the land with the 
public improvement if the condemnation action taken is not within the 
original scope of the condemnation projecl.48 After considering the 
landowner's argument, the coun held that the exception did not .apply 
and that "the trial court did not err in its ... finding that the hJghest 
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and be~t u~e of the land was for grazing cattlel.]" not for use a~ a 
compre~ .. or station.44 
In the Kl'io oral argument!). thi, general rule surfaced when Justice 
Breyer asked Wc,ley W. Horton, counsel for the re~pondcnts. to ad· 
drc .... what would be the right remedy for a homeowner who loses a 
home "just !)o some other people can gel a lot more 1lloney." ~11 Mr. 
Horton initially responded erroneou!)ly by :-;tating that if the case were 
about "ju .. t compensation. in deciding what the fair market value is 
today. you can certainly take into account the economic plan that's 
going into effecl."~l Justice Kennedy corrected Mr. Horton by stating 
lhe general rule. but Justice Scalia intervened by pointing Oul that the 
petitioner was not a .. king for higher compcn .. ation. but was instead 
objecting in principle to the u .. e of eminent domain ba!)cd on the pub· 
lie u .. e rcquireJ1lent, ~! 
Determining value by con:-..idering the nature of the project going 
illlo effect would be contrary to the general rule that it may not be 
taken into account unless the condemnation i!o. not within the original 
.. cope of the project. However. when property i:-. condemned for the 
purpm.c of a .. sembling land for general economic deve lopment. al· 
lowing consideration of the project going into effect and awarding a 
larger .. hare of the profit to the condemnee would off .. et. to some de· 
gree. the di~tll'lte expre~,cd by the Coun and {he general public for the 
idea of Wking property from A to gi\"c to B for (he governmen t'S gen-
~ral economic benefit. 
III. Exceplions to General Rule: Scope of Project Doctrine 
and Prccondcmnation Blight 
The general rule. which is straightforward in theory. becomes compli-
cated In practice when either (I) a property owner own ~ land adjacent 
to a parcel initially condemned by the government. but ou"ide the 
~cope .of the project. and there i~ an increa\e in property value result· 
109 Irom planned improvements. or (2) the government 
precondcmnation activity in the area decrcase~ the market value prior 
to :Lctun.1 condemnation of the landowner"~ properly, 
In either ca~c. the fundamental que ... tion is the same as in all tak-
IIlg,,, ca'les: .what doe'l ju')t compen ... ation require? Does jU'It compen-
.. atlon requlft~ remuneration for an increase in va lue of the second 
parcel due to improvements made by the government on the first? 
Conversely. if the property declines in value because of 
precondemnation activity by the government. muM the property owner 
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silently bear the burden of the decrease? In response to these prob· 
lems. courts have developed two exceptions: (I) the "scope of the 
project doctrine," which Mates that the owner of the subsequently con-
demned parcel is entitled to any incrcase in value if his or her parcel i\ 
outside of the scope of the original project;~-1 and (2) "Kloppillg dam-
ages." which provide the landowner with more than fair market value 
when a court finds actionable governmental precondemnalion activ-
ity. :4 
A. The Scope of the Project Doclr;"e 
The scope of the project doctrine has been applied by courts to limit or 
increa<;e recovery. The United States Supreme Court first sct forth the 
scope of Ihe project doctrine in U"ited Srares v. MiIler.~~ In Miller. the 
federal government condemned a strip across the Millers' land on be-
half of the Centra l Pacific Railroad,'i6 The United States fonnally filed 
a complaint seeking condemnation on December 14, 1938, though 
ahernate routes (including the route across the Millers' property) had 
been surveyed and Slaked by March 1936 and the project had re-
ceived its final authori7ation in August 1937. 57 
At trial. the Millers offered witnesses who teslified to the property'\ 
value a\ of December 14. 1938.~s The government. on the other hand. 
argued thai the Millers were "nol enti tled to have included in an esti· 
Illate of value, . , any increment of value duc" that occurred between 
Augu\t 1937 and December 1938 becau"e "the United States was defi-
nitely committed to Ihe project las on August 26, 1937 ... ,"w The trial 
COUrt agreed with the government and excluded any "value accruing 
after Augu"t 26. 1937 ... :'/>0 
The Supreme Court began ib analysis in Miller by conceding lhal 
~he condemnation of a 'lingle tract may increase the value of surround-
Ing lots "due to the proximity of the public improvement erected on 
the land taken:'fll The Court then set forth the exception: "Islhould 
the Government, at a later date. determine 10 take these other lands. 
it must pay their market value as enhanced by this factor of proxim-
ity:'bJ If. however, "the public project from the beginnin? included 
~he taking of certain tracts but only one of them is taken III the f1,rs! 
Instance. the OWner of the other tracts shou ld not be allowed an :~; 
crea\ed value for his lands which arc ultimately to be taken. , 
According to lhe Court. a trial court faced with similar facts ~u.st 
determine. "whether the respondents' lands were probably wuh,tIl 
the scope of the project from the time the Government was commlt-
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led to it:'/,.! If the parcel was not within the scope of the original 
project. but was "merely adjacent" to the original project, "the sub-
'iequcnt enlargement of the project ... ought not to deprive the re-
spondents of the value added in the meantime by the proximity of 
the improvemcnl."M If. however. the project was within the scope of 
the original project. the "Government ought not ... pay any increase 
in value arising from the known fact thaI the lands probably would 
be condemned. The owners ought not to gain by speculating on prob-
able increase in value due to the Government's aClivities,"b6 In this 
case_ the Millers' land fell clearly within the scope of the project 
because "Itlhe project. from the date of its final and definite authori-
zation in Augu'it 1937. included the relocation of the railroad right-
of-way. and one probable route was marked out over the respondents' 
lands." 1>1 Therefore. "it was proper, .. that the re"pondents were 
entitled to no increase in value arising after August 1937 because of 
the likelihood of the taking of their property.""" 
In a more recent case reflecting the evolution of this doctrine, 
the Tennessee COUft of Appeals in Nashville v, Ol'ernitt' Trallsp. Co, 
explained that "couns have refined the, , , scope of the project rule 
to reflect landowners' and prospective purchasers' reasonable ex-
pectations as to whether a piece of property will be taken,"fl'I Land is 
currently within the scope of the project "when a buyer in the real 
e!)tate mar!,.et would reasonably expect that the property in question 
might become part of the project and when the increase in value of 
the property i!. attributable to speculation on the government'S ac-
• " ." "'11 
tlvllies. In the case before the court. the Tennes!)ee State Depart-
ment of Tran"portation and the Metropoliti.1I1 Nashville Airport 
Authority condemned four acre~ of Overnite's property and a jury 
awarded an enhanced market value of $1.759.578,10 based on the 
new project which included ;m acceSl; road and a new airport tenlli~ 
oal. 71 On appeal. th~ court vacated and remanded the case to the trial 
court because "the foreseeability that the State would take Ovemite's 
property. the length of lime from the date the State committed to the 
new t~rminal project to the date of the taking, and the State's repre-
sentations as to the fina1ity of the original plan!' all support a finding 
that O,ernite's property wa!, within the scope of the new terminal 
project."n 
Although the generaJ rule that the fair market valuation cannot in-
~Iud~ an enhanced value based upon the public improvement has Iim-
lied Just compensation.71 thi!) exception has allowed a landowner to 
benefit from the enhanced value a project generates so long as the prop-
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erty is not part of the initial project plan. In Cil), of Phoenix I'. Clatlss, the 
city of Phoenix condemned 88.567 acres of Clauss' property for inclu. 
sian in the Phoenix Mountain Preserve. which was in existence prior to 
the acquisition and "may have contributed to the desirability of Ithe 
Claus!.' I property:q~ The trial court, applying the general rule over the 
landowner's objection. "instructed the jury that it could assign neither a 
higher nor a lower value to the property if the increase or decrease in 
value was caused by the taking itself or by the planned public project 
that included the taking."7S At trial, the landowner produced a real estate 
appraber who testified that the property was worth $2.965.000 on the 
date of valuation. 76 The jury. however. awarded a mere $1,250.000. n 
The Arizona Court of Appeals referred to the general rule which 
··hold!. that property may not be charged with a lesser or greater value 
at the time of taking. when the change in value is caused by the taking 
itself or by anticipation of appreciation or depreciation arising from 
the planned projecl.'·111 According to the court, "rtJhe condemnor shoul-
ders the burden of proving that the subject property was 'probably 
within the scope of the project from the lime the government was 
commilled to i1.''' 7'1 In thi~ case, Phoenix (the condemnor) did not 
present any evidence that the Clauss' property was within the original 
scope of the project. and the court found Lhat the jury in~lruction in-
correctly ~uggested that the jury "should disregard expert evidence 
frOIll several sources that the location of [the Clauss' J property next 10 
public open space ... enhanced its fair market value." 1U1 The general 
valualion rule was not applied to exclude the enhanced value because 
the property was not within the original scope of the project.sl 
Application of thi~ exception to the property in Ke/o would not 
~a'Ve Mrengthened the petitioner's argument because the ~~openy wo~ld 
likely have been con')idered part of a long·range plan. In Keto, Ill· 
corporation of parcels within a long·range plan facilitated vol.u.ntary 
~ales because landowners were aware that the city had the abIlity to 
c.Ondemn the property if they did nOI sell, but it also generated the 
likelihood of "a more severe holdout problem."" The scope of the 
project doctrine precluded both the volunlUry seJler~ and the 
condemnec)) from negotiating for increased values accord 109. to ex· 
~Clation.., that the new project would bring econom~c pr~spenlY and 
hIgher real C!.Iate values because their property was Identified as pan 
of the Original project. ~ They could not have claimed a higher market 
v.alue based on the planned development because they were nOI OUI-
Side the scope of the project. 
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B. PrecOndemnDtioll ACliI'ily 
It is generally agreed Ihal Ihc landowner is not enlitled 10 any ;IIcreaJe 
in value re:.ulting from the government's precondemnalion activity. 
but what about the converse? b the landowner entitled to 
precondemnation market value when government activity lowers the 
value prior 10 condemnation? The general rule prohibit~ the intended 
public project~~ and the precondcmnation aClivity~h from raising or 
lowering the value of the property for compensation purpose~. The 
general rule, however. is often applied in a one~:-.idcd fa:-.hion. While 
the landowner is typically not emitled to any increase in compensa~ 
tion resulting from government intention:-. with respect to private prop-
erty that government intends 10 compulsorily acquire. the contrary 
principlc I:) not so often litigated.87 Neverthele~". court, in many juris-
dictions have held that Ihreats of condemnation in a variety of forms 
that reduce the value of private property prior to actual condemnation 
require eSlabli<;hmenl of the higher precondemnalion market value for 
purposes of just compen:)ation. 8K 
Of course condemnees have always been awarded full market 
value compensation if the condemnor intentio1l(lI/\' depresses prop~ 
erty values prior to the date of condell1na(ion.8~ C~ml11only referred 
to as Kloppiflg damages, a condemnee Illay recover for 
precondemnation activity which re..,ults in a decline in value prior to 
the date of taking if the condemnor acts unreasonably in I) issuing 
pre~ondell1nation statement..,. 2) excessively delays eminent domain 
actJOIl. or 3} engages in other oppressive conducl.~· 
Actionable precondemnalion activity "may manifest itself in a 
num~'~l of way ... and be presented .... in a variety of procedural con-
texts. For example. a condemnmg agency may "announce ... or 
thr~aten .. that the subject properly is about to be taken. but the 
taking never materializesl. orl similar announcemcnts or threats are 
made .. but are followed by protracted delay ... :'91 Another example 
of actlOnablc precondemnation activity is (he 
... denial of building pcrmitli. sometime ... coupled with a si~ 
Ill~ltane.ous demand that the owner make improvements to 
bnng hIS building up 10 building code rcquirement!oo. I Yet 
al~OI~er governmental ploy is to notify tenants of thc affected 
bulldmgs that a taking is imminent. followed by a protracted 
del~y. thereby leaving the owner with a nearly empty building 
which producc:) not income. but continucs to drain hi:) resources 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3259659 
h Fair Marker Vallie Just COIlllJellsmioll? 147 
through taxes. insurancc premiums, and secured debt sen.ic-
ing.~1 
The rule regarding actionable precondemnalion activity limits courts' 
deference to loc.1I governmental planning. While courts have recog-
nized thal local governmenl, must be allowed some delay and flexibil-
ity to conduct comprehensive. consultative planning.~4 unreasonable 
precondemnation govcmment activity will require a fair market valua-
[ion that accounts for valuation decreases caused by such actionable 
behavior.'1~ If the government activity is determined nOt to be action· 
able. however. the Klopping rule will not apply. producing harsh re-
sults. Missouri I'. Edelen illustrates this harshness when a court fail\ [0 
find that the governmental entity was unreasonable in issuing 
precontlemnation :-.tatements. excessively delaying the eminenl domain 
action. or engaging in othcr oppressive conduct.% 
In Edelell. the Missouri Coun of Appeals refused 10 award damages 
for a declinl: in the value of the landowners' land due 10 a "delay in the 
condemnalion of Select's land ... Ibecausel the excluded evidence 
docs not reveal any specific evidence demonstrating aggravated delay. 
bad raith or untoward activity by the commission.'''? The coun sympa-
thetically noted. howe\'er: 
[wle under\tand Select's fru\tnlting plight. While the sword of 
condemnation hung precariou'ily overhead for 10 years. Se-
lect had 10 watch property value decline without being able to 
sell the land. develop it or 'ice]... legal recour\e. The market 
vallie for it!'. propeny, and nearby property as well. suffered a 
COntinual decline during the years of publicity concerning the 
pending condelllnation.~)( 
Tel111il/a/s Eqllipmem CO. I'. City of Sail Francisco typifies a court's 
auempt to deny a landowner recovery of precondemnation activities by 
characteri..-ing precondel1lnation activity as noncompensable planning 
activity ...... In Termilla!." "the board of supervisors of the City ... adopled 
a resolution [in 19771 dc\ignating <I portion or the Cityl. which included 
TEC's propenY.1 ... as u 'Survey Area' to be Mudied ror possible rede-
veIOPlllcnt."UXl In August 1979, the City Planning Commission adopted 
a resolution calling ror the redevelopment of TEC's property. 101 In Oc-
tOber 1979, TEe sought a building pennit to demolish the existing struc-
ture and build a new structure, which the city deniedy12 The property 
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wa~ held in "limbo" through governmental inaction until June 10. 1988. 
when TEe finally filed a complaint for inverse condemnation and 
prccondemnation damages. un The trial court. however, di:.missed TEes 
complaint for failure to state a claim. II» 
On appeal, the court began by noting the need for some sort of 
fannal announcement in order to recover for prccondemnation activ· 
ity: "In order for any right to precondcmnation damages to accrue .. , 
there must have been either some formal announcement by the con· 
dcmning agency of its intention 10 condemn. or some other official act 
or expression of intent to acquire the property in question."'Q~ The 
court al\o noted that planning does not equal the intent to condemn: 
"[AI planning designation is not the functional equivalent of an an· 
nounced intent to condemn ... 'The plan is by its very nature merely 
tentative and subject to change."· lflII The court then held that "there 
wa~ no resolution of condemnation ... , no announcement of intent to 
condemn, nor, . , any official act by the city towards acquiring the 
property ... ITJhere were public meetings, negotiations. planning. 
debates and an advisory ballot proposition calli ng for acquisition but . 
. . no official act done ... towards acquiring the property."I07 In the 
courl'\ opinion. these aClionli con!'.tituted general. noncompensable 
planning. I!I1I 
Precondemnation activity by government clearly affects the mar· 
ket value of private property prior to actual condemnation. The line 
between activity designed to purposely decrease market value and 
activity Ihat unintentionally causes 'iuch decrease is often blurred. Since 
it is generally accepted thai increases in value due to the nature of a 
project on land to be condemned may nOI be considered in awarding 
compem.ation. it i!'. only fair that, conver!'.ely. a decrease in such value 
ought abo to be ignored in the compensation proce!'.s so that the prop· 
erty i!'. valued based on a fair markel value determination prior to 
any precondemn at ion activity. 
IV. Making Just Compensation Just 
W~en the government exercises its eminent domain power to ac· 
qUlr~ pr~pe~t~ needed for private redevelopment to increase the eco· 
nomic viability of the community. the general ru le. as discussed. 
preclud~s th~ condemnee from claiming the greater value anticipated 
fro~ this pnvate redevelopmenl. '09 Thus. as Justice Kennedy pointed 
out In oral a~~ument. "when A is losing property for the economic 
benefit of B. the general rule requires that the project be ignored 
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when the value is determined. " o Justice Kennedy inquired as to 
whether there i ..... any scholar ..... hip to support awarding a development 
premium to a condemnee when property is being taken from one 
private person and given to another." 1 Though there has been some 
scholarship, "[v)aluing just compensation turns OUI to be largely 
un~ludied but e ..... sential for defining the extent of constitutional pro-
tection for private property." I1~ 
While the Kelo litiganb. focused on the public use portion of the 
Fifth Amendment to protect their private propeny, Ihe Justices spent 
al least 20 percent of their lime during ora l argument talking about 
compensation."·1 In reference to the then pending Kelo decision, it 
wa~ obse rved thm instead of deciding whether a local government is 
allowed 10 take property for commercial purposes. "the Coun could 
permit the governmenl 10 condemn property for commercial u~es. 
bUI only by paying at lea ..... t some portion of the resulting gain,"ll. It 
was a~serted that "the adequacy of compensation cannot be deter-
mined in the ab~tract but mUM rather be judged by how effectively a 
damages award advances the goals of the Takings Clause.""s This 
section will consider how just compensation is. or should be. deter-
mined in the Kelo context where property is being assembled through 
eminent domain for a redevelopment project expecled to bring eco-
nomic benefit primarily to private entities and only illdirectly 10 the 
community. 
In Kimball Laulllin' Co. ) 1. United Stales, the Supreme Court made 
it clear that markel price is the proper measurement of cOl11pensat~on 
under the Fifth Amendment, even though property value may 111-
c1ude altribute~ that arc not transferable: 
The value of property springs from subjective needs and aui-
tude~: its value to the owner may therefore differ widely from 
it\ value to the taker. Most things, however have a general 
demand which gives them a value transferable from one owner 
to another. As opposed 10 such personal and variant stan-
dards as value 10 the particular owner whose property. ~as 
been laken, this Iran~ferable va lue has an external validity 
which makes it a fair measure of public ob ligation to com-
pensate the loss incurred by an owner as a resu lt of the tak-
ing of his property for public use,lII! 
The Coun has also noted. however, thai there arc some si tmujons 
Where market value is not the appropriate standard."7 The goa l of 
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ju~t compensation is "to put the owner of condemned property 'in as 
good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken:"1lS 
The COlirt acknowledged that "this principle of indemnity has not been 
given its full and literal force:'I I* and recognized that this "indemnity 
principle must yield to some extent before the need for a practical 
general rule"llfl such as market value, Although the Court found it 
appropriate to apply the fair market value rule in the case before it.
1ll 
it has not always used market value as the only measure of just com-
pensation, The Coun has refused to apply the general fair market value 
rule where its application "would be impracticable. , , [orl ' , . diverge 
"0 substantially from the indemnity principle as 10 violate the Fifth 
Amendment." lu 
The Coun reiterated in United States l'. Commodities Tradillg Corp. 
that fair markct value may not always be an appropriate standard, 
.. pccifical\y where "market value has been too difficult to find. or when 
its application would rcsult in manifest injustice to owner or public."l 13 
In situations like Kelo where privale property is condemned to indi-
rectly benefit the public by assembling land for private development, 
market value may not be difficult to find. However. the owner may be 
treated unjustly if the general rule that just cOl11pcn~ation "is measured 
by the property owner'~ lo~s rather than the government'~ gain" is 
applied .'~4 The rule precludes a condcmnee from sharing any pre-
mium realizcd by a private entity that ha .. benefited directly from the 
government acquisition. The property owner is not entitled to any 
nonpecuniary losse, ,uch a~ tho~e "attributable to 'his unique need or 
propcrly or idio .. yncratic allachment to il. ' '' I~' Without a change in 
thc~e general rule'). ju .. t compensation may not always be justY" 
. The Kdo majority rccogniLcd that the rairness of the just compensa-
tion determination is important. but declined to di\Cuss the i')slIe since 
"thesc que .. tiom. are not before u, in thi, 1111galiol1." 1!7 The majority 
cmphasi/cd that .. tale, are allowed 10 place further restrictions on the 
exercise or eminent domain power. 12M As the Court pointed out, this has 
a.lrcady been done through the judicial interpretalion of Slate con'titu~ 
tumal law and through state eminent domain .. tatutes. 1l9 State legisla-
ture .. can provide for additional fOlclor, to be included in the just 
compcn\at~on calculation and can grant premium compcno;aLion when 
condcmnallon~ are undertaken for economic rcvitaliLation. State courtS 
can abo include additional components to the fair market value stan-
d~rd to determine just compensation. In fact, trial court' are generally 
glvcn great discretion l ") in. deciding what constitutes just compensatio,n 
so that the property owner IS PUI '''in a~ good a po,ition pecuniarily as If 
.. 
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his propeny had not been takcn:"OI The traditional rules rCMricLing thi~ 
determination to fair mJr~et value can be expanded by judicial deci. 
sions to include additional components such as inlere'il. damages for 
loss of goodwill. relocation expen'ies. and even subjective value~. 
For example. in Board of Com", 'rs of Tel/sas Ba.fill Lel'ee Dis,. I'. 
Crauford. n2 the Louisiana appellate court, relying on state precedent. 
allowed "\everance damages" for the loss in value to property re· 
tained by the landowner. IJ.' The Levee Districi"s condemnation of a 
riyerfront "eryilude reduced the yard size of homes creating a loss of 
foliage. \\hich affected aesthetic considerations and reduced thc mar· 
kct value of the remaining propeflY.n~ The court also awarded the 
landowner c:-;,pert wilness fees and anomey's fees to help him obtain 
just cOll1pen~alionY~ In Co/Illry of Wayne I', flalheoc/.;. the Michigan 
Supreme Court overruled the infamous Polctown case. finding that 
"POletOlI'11 's conception of a public use-that of 'alleviating unem· 
ployment and revitalizing the economic base of the community' has 
no \UPPOI1 in the Court's eminent domain juri'iprudence:'L'IIi The New 
Hampshire Supreme Court has similarly interpretcd it~ ",tate constitu· 
tiona I requirement of public u~e to limil eminent domain power to 
only those condemnation~ that directly benefit the public,1\7 Califor· 
nia, on the other hand. has cho\en to restrict the power statutorily by 
allowing the taking of land for economic deve/opment only when the 
area has been de~igl1ated a", blighled. p~ 
Intere:>.! paYlllenh have also been awarded under both state and 
federal 1<1\\0 a:. a component of just compen<.,ation when the govern· 
ment condemns land but delays the payment disbursement. 1w The 
government is not required 10 pay interest when it "pays the owner 
before or at the lime the property is taken,"I4(l However. if the go .... ern· 
ment delay ... di ... bursemcnt. the landowner is entitled to an award ,of 
intereq "to ensure that he is placed in as good a position pecunianly 
a~ he would have occupied if the payment had coincided with the 
approprialion." 141 In California, for example. interest is awarded "hcn 
the go .... ernment takes property under a "quick·take·· procedure and 
defer ... payment to Ihe landowner,14~ Although the state \latute pro· 
vides for the interest award in addition to other damages such as loss 
of busine,,~ goodwill,l'~l a \l:uutOry ceiling on lhe interest award, i\ not 
Constitutional if the statutory guidelines arc inadequate to prOVide the 
I .. ~ andowncr with ju ... t compensation under the state con::.tllullon or 
Fifth Amendment. I~~ 
Federal courts have 31 ... 0 been flexible in determining fair m,ar~et 
value. In Yancey I', UI/ired Stalt!!!. the Federal Circuit included III Its 
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detemlinalion of fair market value "an assessment of the property's capac-
ity to produce future income if a reasonable buyer would consider that 
capacity in negotiating a fair price for the property:' l~~ The court al-
lowed turkey fanne~ to receive compensation for the g.ovemment quar-
antine of di'>Ca.<;ed nock!-. based on the commercial value of the birds as 
a breeder flock capable of producing hatching cgg~.'.IfJ While the court 
did not consider this compensation to con~titute I ()~I profits. which are 
not available under the Fifth Amendment, it did allow lhe Claims Court 
to consider lhe property's potential future income when assessing mar-
ket value. '''7 
Though federal courts have shown some Ocxibility. it i:-, doubtful 
thai federal legislation restricting eminent domain power would be 
constitutionally viable under the Public Use C lause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. 1olll At the very least. however, federal legislation can be effective 
to help ensure that the just compensation determination is just. For 
example. the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Ac-
quisition Policies for Federal and Federally Assisted Programs Act of 
1970 thereinafter Uniform Relocation Act]'4'1 provides <.1ssistance in 
certain circum<;lances to residents and bU'iinesse:-, displaced by emi-
nent domain by giving relief in the form of moving expense~. a dislo-
cation allowance. an accommodation down payment. and o ther 
incidental expcn!.es.!~1 The Uniform Relocation Act does not apply to 
urban renewal projects that are not federal in nature such as those that 
are ba!.ed on locally financed program!o. l~1 or private developmenl. l~~ 
Com.equently. thi!'. federal legislation will not be mcful to increase lhe 
compensation level awarded to landowner<; di<;placed by state or local 
economic redevelopment program5. like that undertaken by the city or 
New London in the Kelo case. m 
Federal legi!.lation may not be ab le to adequately addre'is the is-
sues at hand. but !.tate legislatures can provide for additional compo· 
nent ... of the fair market value determination in redevelopment ca!o.es 
I~ke Kelo. 1'\..l Some state!. have specifically granted specia l compensa-
tion for redevelopment condemnations. In Oklahoma. "urban renewal 
c.ondcmnations may be classified separately from other condemn a-
tl?m. for purposes of awarding altorney fees." "~ and statute!. that pro· 
vide for such a di!'.tinction have been uphe ld as constitutional.l~ The 
Kansas Supreme Court has also upheld a Mate urban redevelopment 
sta~ute wh.ich granted a 25 percent compensa tion premium and relo· 
calion aSSI!.tance payments to owners of property condemned for re· 
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development. In 
In spite of ~tates' ability to further limit the government's eminent 
domain power. legal scholars have continued to criticize the effective-
ness of the fair market value :,tandard and have suggested alternative 
standards. Professor Thomas W, Merrill. as the Counsel of record for 
the amicu.!. brief by the American Planning Association in support of 
the respondents, argued that "[aJdjusting compensation awards to pro-
vide more complete indemnification would be a far morc effective 
reform of the existing .!Iy~tem of eminent domain than increasing fed-
eral judicial review of public use detcrminalions:" ~8 Professor Merrill 
has advocated reform for some time and has suggeMcd at least two 
alternatives to using the fair market value standard. IW One alternative 
is to compensate the condemnee based on the benefit received by the 
emity taking the property. l(>() 
In the land assembly situation, such as thai found in the Kelo case. 
the parcels involved in the project generally have a higher unit vaJue 
once the condemnation process hal; successfully as.!.embled the land. 
An unjust enrichment standard, as one alternate suggested by Profes-
sor Merrill. would likely render greater compensation than the fair 
market value measure. lft l A second alternative i~ to measure compen-
~ation based on the owner's loss. '61 Such an indemnification ... tandard 
would result in higher awards because it would take into account sub-
jective damagc~ and "all consequential damages associated with con-
demnation, such a.!. lo~t future profits, lost business goodwill associated 
with the location of the property. moving ex.penses, and attorneys' 
fees:' 161 
Professor ChriMophcr Serkin also suggests several approaches for 
resolving the "deep confmion and contradictory approaches" taken 
by the courH. in measuring the fair market valueY'" From seemingly 
facH,pecific computations of compensation in the cases. he identifies 
nine different valuation mechanisms, several of which are directly rel-
eVant to the Kelo land assembly scenario. 'f,j In particular, Profes~or 
Serkin notes that a property owner may obtain higher compensation 
where ··the purpose of the taking is to create or facilitate a new com-
mercial enterprise" if the condemnee is "allowed 10 capture at least 
~Ome of the benefit of the new enterprise:' I66 He also observes that 
While the Court's general rules preclude awarding compensation for 
SUbjective value. "damage awards can implicitly compensate for. at 
least Some subjective value by redefining the property taken to Ill' 
elUde an owner's special use for her property."167 Finally. although 
generally prohibited. courts have awarded replacement value as an 
d 
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alternative to fair market value in r.;ituationr.; where mar\...et \ alue i~ not 
• • . .•.. ll>~ 
known or where such a mea"ure would result In T11anJte~t iOJusuce. 
V. Conclusion 
In ex.crci<;ing the power of eminent domain. govemmcnt ex.crcises one 
of ilS most draconian power" over it'i citi/ens: the compulsory depriva-
tion of property. Liberals and con"ervativcr.; .... chu lar" and praclitioner~. 
have lamented thc unfairness of gOvernment condemnations of homes 
for redevelopmcnt programsy,.1 And now. the Kelo decision has gener-
ated a great ou tcry from the general public again ... t the government's 
power to condemn private properly for the sale purpose of increasing 
the economic benefit of land use. l711 The Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution provides for two level ... of protection against the ex-
erci-.e of thi'i powcr: public u\c and just compensation. 111 The just com-
pensation determination provide<., a mechanism for court>.; ami legislatures 
to control government abu ... e by demanding that property owners be 
treated fairly when they are required to involuntarily relinquish their 
private property rights. With the seriou<., dedine in protection providcd 
by the Public Use Clause. In the protection provided through the right to 
ju<.,t cmnpcnl,ation need~ to be as <.,ccure as possible. 
The fair market value swndard. however. may not adequately se· 
cure the right to just compensation. Professor Gidcon Kanner main-
tain>.; that eminent domain law has failed to progrc ... s over the ycars 
and that .. (tJhe problem of undercompensation is <;till with ut;." pl The 
scope of the project doctrine and damages for ac ti onable 
precondemnation activities (whether or not "intentional") arc not suf-
tIL-ient e'l;ceptions to the general rulc that fair market valuc mu"it be 
determined without regard to thc economic benefit or detrimcnt of the 
public dc\'elopmcnt project. If landowncr" arc denied the beneficial 
impact of public dc\.-clopmenl on the fair mar\...et value of the con-
dcmned property. they t;hould also be entit led to u fair market valua-
tio~ ?ased on the land value as it ex.isted before any precondemnation 
aCII\lty, regardless of the government's motivation. In addition to al-
lowlI1g a condemnee to claim a premium by overriding thc general 
rule when A is lo ... ing propeny for the economic benefit of B. perhaps 
other components of valuation like <.,ocial value. relocation, attorneys' 
fec<.,. and replacement value shou ld be taken into account when deter-
mining just compen>.;ation. 
• 
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impact on the rair market value that resulted from the taking itselr ~hould be excluded. The 
propeny i~ to be \ialued as if the government proje<:tlhat resulted in the taking was neither 
contemplated nor carriedouC): III re Appropriation ofPropeny of Bunner. 28 Ohio Mi..c. 
165. 170 (Ohio Misc. 1971) ("As II general principle.lhe owner is .. not entitled to rccei\e 
any enhanced value which aecrue"to hi~ property by reason of the propo~d projeet."l: City 
of San Diego v. Rancho Pena~quilos P\hip. 105 Cal. App. 4th 1013. 1029 (Cal. Ct. App. 
:!(XHH",I!n determining fair market value. .. any jm;rease or decren~e in Ihe propeny's 
\-'alue caused by the projeci i~lr may nOI be considered .. "J: Soridr. 252 N.E.2d al588 
{"Neither an inerea<,e nor a decrease in market value of property sought to be condemned 
whIch i~ brought atkllli by same project for which property is being taken may be considered 
in detcrminmg \alueof.,uch property,"): Brainerd \, State. 131 N.Y.S. 221. 228 (N.Y. 1911 1 
t:Tfhe premisc~'1 marLet value must be fixed without regard 10 the pro\pect of the con~truc· 
tlOn oflhc new canal. for,uch a rule might give to claimant, in \o,"e cases more than Ihelr 
propeny" wonh and in others les~ than its value."): MumlY v. United State ... 130 F.2d 442. 
444 {D ,C. 19421 ("'\111' determining the compensation for the land being condemned they 
,hall not lake IIIto con~iderntion an} effect. whethcr hy enhancement or diminution. which 
the- pUfPO,e nr mtentinn of the gmemment 10 acquire Ihi .. property for public U\C may have 
had upun It~ \alue."·). 
26. 397 L:_S. 14. 16(1970). 
27. Su. t.g,. NC. G El«. STo\T. § 404-63 (1984) C"The determination orlhe amount of 
compen_,auon ,hall rcnectthe value of the propeny immediately prior 10 the filing of ... the 
compialOt under a.s 4OA-4 I and ... hall not reneet an increase or decrease due \0 the 
condemnation, The d:y of the fi1ingofa petition oreompl:lint ,hall be Ihe date of\'alulltion 
of Ihe IIItCreSIIB.ken_ ): ALA. CODI' ,§ 18-IA-22 (" In a tOla1Iakin£. the condemnor ~hall 
dIsregard any deereaM! or IIIcrease III the fair market value or the propeny caused by the 
proJe~t for' ... hlch the propeny IS lobe acquired or by Ihe reasonable likelihood thM the 
property Will be acqUIred for Ihal pro.JCet. other than nomml depreciation .. ). CAL Clv. PROC. 
~;:- § 1263.-330r1l1e falrmarlet value orthe propeny taken shall not i~d'ude any incre:bC 
""',a~e III the value of the property that is attributable to any of the following: (a) The 
project or .... hlch the propen,· I'· (b Th' - ""h "-lor, _a"en. ) e emlllent domalll proceedIng III w le II ... 
property ~ .. laken. (e) Any prehmlOary nellons of the plaintiff relating 10 the taking of Ihe 
p:pc~y. ): Moot-J. El"m;p., Do\-lAIN Com § 1005 (1986) (Slating that fair market value of 
p pe. Y does not. IIIdude IIICn:asc or decrea!)C In value caused by proposal of imprmemenl 
or project ror whIch property IS taken). 
28. 252 N.E.2d 582. 582 (Ind. 1969). 
29. rd. at 588. 
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30. ItI 




35. /d (citing Mtlryl;md Nat'l ParI.. and Planning Comm'n \-. M(:Cllw. 229 A.2d 584 
(Md. 1%7); Unitcd States v. 7-l.60Acres. 358 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1966); Unitcd State'l \-
~lIl1er. 317 L.S. 369 (19-l2): Kcrr \-. South ParI.. Comrn·rs. 117 U.S. 379 (1886); State Rood 
Ocp't .... Chicone. 158 So. 1d 753. 757 (Fla. 1963) (If this rule ..... cre follo ..... cd. it "would 
pennit a condemnor to depreciate propeny valuelo by threat of condemnation and tnL.e 
ad\oantage of Ihe dcpres.,ed ,alue which rcloulted by paying thc landowner the depreciated 
~alue. This ..... ould amount to a confi'>C3lion of an o ..... ner ·!;, propeny to the extent of !he 
deerca!>C in 'value.")). 
36. 571 S.E.2d 831. 833-35 (2002). 
37. I(/. at 835 (quoting N.C. GE."1 ST.o.T. § 40A-65 (1981)). 
38. 1tI. at 837. 
39. 53 P.3d 725. 726-27 (Colo. CI. App. 2(02). 
40 1tI. at 727. 
-ll Id. 
42 It/. 
41 739 S.W.1d 130. 130-31 (1987). 




48. Set' di~cu~ ... i()n iI/fro Pan I I IA. 
49. M.at 131. 
50. Oral Argumcnt Tran'>Cript. supra note 4, at 50. 
51. Id 
52. Id. 
53. United SI,ile'" \. Miller, 317 U.S. 369. 372( 1943); Rrmold5. 397 U.S. aI2O-21; su 
lillI/City of Kenai \. Bumett. 860 P.Zd 1233. 1243 (1993){'1be 'scope of the project' rule 
h'l~ twu cumponent" .. Fif'>!. ifthc land is 'probably within the ~opeorlhe gO~'emmental 
proJL'Ct tor which 1\ i~ being condemned at the tnnc the Govcmmcnt becamecommllled 10 the 
project. then the owner lli not enllllcd 10 any Increment In ... alue occasIOned by the 
Government\ undertaking the projl!ct." (quoting City of Val del v. 18.99 Acres. 686 P.2d 
689. 689 (Ala~~a 1984)); Mallo", Corp. v. Slate. 321 N.V.S.2d 734. 737 (NY. 19711 ("lfll 
be c~tabJi .. hed on trial that cllllmalll's propeny W'as ..... ithm <;cope of project from lime stale 
""a~ committed to it. then any dcpre~sion in .. alue of such propeny brought about by 
de, elupment of projl!ct ~hould be excluded In detenmning fair market value of propeny 
10ken."). 
$4. St>t>. t!.g., \''cIfllt' fJeprecjtJtjofl Ctlu5l'd by Cloud o!COIUI""IIIOIion (BAJI), JJ~ 20CH 
edlllOn, The Civil Committee on California Jury Instructions (dlscu5smg Cahfornla Jury 
In\lruction 11.79 regarding K1ol'I,,"g damages. which states the general rule that ",lin 
detemunlng fair marl-et value.tlhe court shou ld l disregard any decrease In market value. 
.. . .. d llQ(e~ !hat 
tau'iCd hy the likelihood thai it would bcoequircd for lhe pubhc Impro\emcnt an 
If the JUry find~ exces~i\lc delay in the eOllUnenccmenl ofthc actIOn "following an IUlnountt-
ment of illlent to condemn subject property.ltilc \'crdict should include]. , the amount of 
defcndam\ I~~ of rental income from the subjecl property •. due to thiS delayl. and] the 
d 
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additional amount .. . the . . . property would have been worth on the date of valuation but 
forthe delay."). . . . ' 's' 
When considering precondemnation government activity, allot~er qU~Sllon ansI,; . 
should there be a diMinclion. for purposes of dctcnnining value, between ~lHentlonal g~vem­
men! action to drive down compensation (Kloppillg doctrine) and aelian beyond simple 
planning that will have the same effect? 
55. 317 U.S. 369. 372 (1943). 
56. Id. at 370. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 372. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 376. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 376-77. 





69. 919 S.W.2d 598. 603 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 600. 
72. Id. at 608-09. 
73. See. e.g., Mobeco Indus .. Inc. v. City of Omaha, 598 N.W.2d 445, 448-49 (Neb. 
1999) (finding that seven lots were included in a project from its conception and concludmg 
that Ihe cOlldclllllce was not entitled 10 compensation "for any increase in the va l u~ of.~he 
subject propcrlic:o, due to the p.mial completion of the project prior to the date of takmg ). 
74. 869 P.2d 1219. 1220 (Ari/. Ct. App. 1994). 
75. Id. at 1222. 
76. Id. at 1221. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 1222. 
79. Id. (citing City ofTucson v. Ruelas. 508 P.2d 1174, 1176 (Ari7. Ct. App. 1973». 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Keto. 125 S. Ct. 3t2656 (The long-range plan included possibilities like the pfi7er 
facility. 3 19th-century fon scheduled to become a Slate park. a planned hotel. office space. 
a wastewater treatment facility. and a marina. among other projected uses.). 
83. Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 4. at 40. 
84. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2656. 
85. See, e·R .. Hammond v. Marina Entm't Complex, 733 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. Ct. MP' 
2(00). 
86. COII/p"re United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 636 (1961)("T~e 
value of the easement must be neither enhanced nor dimini ... hed by the special need which t e 
government had for it."), lI'irh III re 572 Warren Street. 298 N.V.S.2d 433 (N.V. 1968) 
(holding that ""the City may not by vinue of a condemnation and by its own action cause.a 
d '" I . n IS eprecJalion In va ue of propeny to be condemned and then claim that ju .. t compensatlO 
that depreciated value"). 
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87. See William Anderson, COl/sequellces of AlIlicipated Eminelll Domai1l Proceed-
illgs- Is Lon of Value a Factor? 5 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 35 (1964) (one of the first 
scholarly cOlllmentaries explaining why a landowner should be entitled to present evidence 
of lower market value due to government precondemnalion activity short of condemnation 
blight). A recent Hawaii case involving the compulsory purchase of Waimea Falls Park 
illustrates this issue. Waimea Falls Park occupied 300 acres in Waimea Valley on the island 
of Oahu. across a highway from the public Waimea Beach Park. The park owner filed for 
bankruptcy protection and offered the park and virtually all of the rest of the valley for sale 
in July 2000 at a listing price of$25 million. In November 2000, it received a formal offer 
of $17.9 million from a buyer in New York for use as a private residential estate, thereby 
establishing a minimum "market value." Appalled at the probable loss of the valley for the 
public to lise and view. various groups urged the Honolulu City Council to take action to 
preserve the park as a public park. In August 2000, two members of the city council 
proposed a resolution that directed the mayor of Honolulu to use all means al his disposal to 
acquire the park. including compulsory purchase. if necessary. The mayor of Honolulu 
proposed to set aside only $5 million to acquire theentire valley. The public statements and 
the passage of the resolution in October 2000 affected the 
market value of the site. and a year later the Honolulu City Council passed a resolution of 
condemnation, and later set aside $5 mi Ilion but offered far less-far below the market value 
of the property (at least $17.9 million) just months before. Honolulu has since taken posses-
sion of the park and leased it to the local Audubon Society, which now manages it for the 
pUblic. However. the amount due the bankrupt owner is the subject of a lawsuit over the 
compulsory taking and purchase of the park. Honolulu maintained the value is $3 million. 
which it claill1~ is its current appraised value. The owner claims the value is at least $17.9 
million. or the fair market value before the ity council's precondemnation statements nnd 
activity caused the market value to drop sharply. While one can appreciate the need for 
preserving the valley as a public resource. it is not clear why the owner should be forced to 
~ell the property to Honolulu at a discount of more than 80% less than market value just 
bccau!-;e the publ ic wants the property for a public park. The case was scheduled fortrial in 
February of 2006. but was settled before trial commenced when a coalition of government 
agencies and public interest groups agreed to pay the landowner $12 million for the land . 
. 88. See. e.R .. Township of West Windsor v. Nierenburg. 695A.2d 1344 (N.J. 1996) and 
lurther ca..,es cited therein. 
89. Klopping v. Cily ofWhillier. 500 P.2d 1345. 1353-54 (Cal. 1972). 
90. Id. aI 1355-56; see also CilY of Sparks v. Armslrong. 748 P.2d 7. 9 (Nev. 1987) 
("Although the mere planning of a project is generally insufficient to conStitute a ta.klO~. 
when prccondcmnation activitie~ of the govemment become unreasonable or oppressIve In 
\uch a Illanner that those activities adversely affect the market value of the property. then the 
property Owner is 
cmilled 10 compensalion."); Clark Counly v. Sun Slale Prop" 72 P.3d 954. 961 (Nev. 2(03) 
("In Slate Departmelll of TrallS/JOrlotion \'. 8arsy. this courl h~ld th~t. the cond:mnor s 
precondelllnation activitie~ may entitle lhecondemnee to damages In additIon to lhecol~~n­
'alion for Ihc I,king."); III re 572 Warren SlreCl. 298 N. Y.S.2d 433. 433 ( . Y. 1968) ( The 
City may not by vil1l1e ora condemnation and by its own action caus~ a d~precJatlon In ~~Iue 
of property to be condemned and then claim that just compensallon IS tha~ de~recaated 
value."); Weay v. Slva",k. 700 N.E.2d 347.359 (Ohio 0. App. 1997) ("Ordillanly. prop-
eny taken for public use must be valued as of date of trial. ... unless pnor ~ssesslOn IS 
taken: however. an exception ... is that \I. here activity of appropriating authon~y ... c~used 
depreciation ... prior to time that it is actually taken. property will be valued ImmedIately 
pnor to its depreciation."). 
... 
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91. Gideon Kanner. Condemnation Blight: Just How JustIs Just COmIJensmioll? 48 
N.D. LAW REV. 4 (1973). 
92. /d. 
93. /d. 
94. Kloppi"g. 500 P.2d at 1350 n.1 ("To allow recovery in every instance in which a 
public authority announces its intention to condemn some uns.pccified portion of a larger 
area in which an individual's land is located would be to severely hamper long-range 
planning by ... authorities, some of which may be required by state law."). 
95. See. e.g .. Cily of Cleveland v. Carcione. 190 N.E.2d 52. 57 (Ohio C .. App. 1963) 
(awarding landowner market value of property prior to city's activities which depreciated the 
value of the property by encouraging tenants 10 move out more than two years in advance of 
the urban renewal condemnation); Wash. Univ. Med. elr. Redev. Corp. v. Gaertner. 626 
S.W.2d 373. 375 (Mo. 1982) (allowing recovery in Ion for a landowner whose property 
value was depre~sed by the city's blight designation three years before condemnation). 
96. 872 S.W.2d 551. 558 (Mo. C .. App. 1994). 
97. 1<1. 
98. Id. 
99. 270 Cal. Rptr. 329.331·36 (Cal. C .. App. 1990). 
100. Id. at 331-32. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. aI323·33. 
104. 1<1. 
105. Id. al 335. 
106. Id. al336 (ciling Guinnane v. Cily and County of San Francisco, 241 Cal. Rptr. 787, 
792 (Cal. C .. App. 1987». 
107. 1<1. 
108. Id.aI336·37. 
109. See supra text accompanying notes 25-54. 
110. Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 4, at 22. 
III. 1<1. 
112. Christopher Scrkin, The Meaning of Va/lie: Assessi1/g Just Compe".wtionfor Regu-
latory Takings. 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 677. 678 (2005). 
113 . See generally Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 4 (discussing the issue of just 
compensation and possible adjustments to the compensation paid). 
114. Serkin, supra note 112. at 742 11.55. 
115. Id. al 681. 
116. 338 U.S. 1.5(1949). 
117. Uniled Slales v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506. 51 I (1979). 
118. Id. al 510 (quoling Olson v. Uniled Slales. 292 U.S. 246. 266 (1934». 
119. Id. at 510·11. 
120. id.aI512. 
121. Id. at 516 ("Respondent, like other private owners, is not entit led to recover for 
nontmnsferable values arising from ils unique need for the property."). 
122. id.aI513. 
123. 339 U.S. 121. 123 (1950); bUI see Michael Debow Unjusl COlllfJemllli()n. 46 S.c. 
L. REV. 579. 581 (1995) (noling Ihal even 'hough Ihe Supre;"e Court "has s,;,ed Ihm markel 
value ~s not a 'feush' and that the market value approach 'may not be the best measure of 
value IJl some cases[ J' the ki ds f . h ' .. . n 0 cases t at call for different measures of compensatton 
have been narrowly defined" (quoling Uniled Slales v. Corso 337 U.S. 325. 332 (1949)); 
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elynn S. Lunney. Jr .. Compensaaonfor Takings: Haiti Much Is Just ?, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 
721.729·30 (noting that although Supreme Coun has suggested that market value might be 
an unfair standard. in practice, propeny Owners have not successfully convinced Coun to 
u~e an alternative standard). 
124. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash .. 538 U.S. 216.235-36 (2003). 
125. /d. at 236 (quoting Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1,5 (1949». 
126. See. e.g .. Frank I. Michelman, Properly. Utility, and Faimess: Commews on the 
Ethical FOUI/till/iolls of"Just Compensation" Law, 80 H ARV. L. REV. 1165, 1210·11 ( 1967) 
(discussing dcmoraliz.1Iion costs to owners when propeny is condemned); Michael Debow. 
Unjust Compellsll/iol/: The COll/illuing Need for Reform, 46 S.c. L. Rev. 579. 580 (1995) 
(federa l law h<Js been criticized but not reformed because of ilsjust compensation definition. 
which tends 10 undcrcompensate); Thomas W. Merrill.lncompJete Compensation/or Tak-
ings. I J N. YU. ENVTI . L. J. 110. III (2002)(noting that in American law "just cornpensa. 
tion means incomplete compensation"); Thomas W. Merrill. The Economics a/Public Use. 
72 CO",ElL L. REV. 61. 82-85 (1986) (proposing to panially modify the basic model of 
eminent domain to take into account subjective losses and other personal losses "such as losl 
goodwill. con~cquenlial damages to other property, relocation costs. and attorney fees," and 
to allow courts to "closely scrutinize the decision 10 condemn whenever an owner's subjec-
tive losse~ are high"); Margaret Jane Radin, Propenyand Person/wad, 34 STAN. L. R EV. 957, 
1006 (1982) (noting that the personhood perspective has sometimes given eXira protection 
10 cenain property rights even though il has nOI provided a general limit on eminent domain). 
127. Kelo. 125 S. CI. at 2668 n.21 (citing Brief for American Planning Association et al. 
as amici curiae. 26-30). 
128. Kelo. 125 S. Ct. at 2668. 
129. Id. 
130. See. e.g .. N.E. Conn. Econ. Alliance, Inc. v. ATC P'ship, 861 A.2d 473, 484-85 
(Conn. 2004) (concluding "thai the trial court properly considered the availability ofstatc 
economic devclopmcm grant funds in calculating the fair market value of Ihe propeny"); 
Wronowski v. Redev. Agency. 430 A.2d 1284. 1287 (Conn. 1980) (finding that "coun 
correctly considered the existence on the plaintiffs' propeny of an established speCial busI· 
ness use combined with the many unusual characteristics of the propeny as factors which 
would enhance its fair market value"). 
131. 564.54 Acres of /..(II/d. 441 U.S. at 510 (quoting Olson v. United States. 292 U.S. 
246. 266 ( 1934)). 
132. 731 So. 2d 508 (La. Ct. App. 1999). 
133. Id. at 514. 
134. /d. at 514-16. 
135. Id. at 516-17. 
136. 684 N. W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004) (quoting Poletown Neighborhood Council v. 
City of Detroit. 304 N. W.2d 445,460 (Mich. 198 1». 
137. See Merrill v. City of Manchester, 499A.2d 216, 238-39 (N.H. 1985). 8 
138. See. e.R .. Redev. Agency of Chula Vista v. Rados Bros., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234, 23 : 
39 (2002) (citi ng the Community Redevelopment Law, CAL. HEALTII . & SAFETY CODE § 
33000 et seq. (West 200 I». 984 .. 
139. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. I, 10-11 (I ) (c,tmg 
Phelps v. United States. 274 U.S. 341. 344 (1927); Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. United 
States, 261 U.S. 299. 306 (1923»; Wi Ison v. City of Fayetteville, 838 S. W.2d 366 (Ark. 
1992); Redev. Agency of the City of Burbank v. Gilmore. 38 Cal. 3d 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1985). 
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140. Kirby Fore" Indu, .. 467 U.S. at 10 (citing Danfonh v. United States. 308 U.S. 271. 
284 (1939)). 
141. !d.at 10-11. 
142. Rede,. Agency v. Gilmore. 700 P.2d 794. 804 (Cal. 1985). 
143. Id. at 804 (citing CAl. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1263.510 et seq. (West 1985)). 
144. Id. at 802-<X> (determining a constitutionally proper raLe of interest requires the trial 
court to examine "the rate~ prevailing during the period a condemnation payment wa~ 
delayed for all forms of money-market obligations, governmental and private. which pru-
dent dcpo!o.itors and investors normally purchase for income purposes. and whose terms or 
maturities fall within the period of delay"), 
145. 915 F.2d 1534, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Yachls Am. v. United States, 779 F.2d 
656.660 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cerro dellied. 479 U.S. 832 (1986)). 
146. Id. 
147. Id. (citing United States v. Gen. Motors Corp .. 323 U.S. 373. 379 (1945). 
148. See, e.g .. City of Boerne V. Flores, 521 U.S. 507. 519-20 (discussing RFRA's 
inability to change the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution in a previous case). 
149. 42 U.s.c. § 4601 (1983). 
150. See James Geoffrey Durham & Dean E. Sheldon III. Mitigating the Effects of Pril'ate 
Rel'itali=..atirm 011 HOl/sillg/or the Poor. 70 MARQ. L. REV. 1.36-38 (1986). See, e.g., Yaist v. 
Uniled States. 17 CI. Ct. 246. 263 (Fed. CI. 1989) (allowing reimbursement under the 
Uniform Relocation Act for "reasonable costs. disbursemcnt~, and expenses. including 
reasonable attorney, apprai!o.al. and engineering fees"). 
151. Feliciano '. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 656. 672 (S.D. N.Y. 1973). 
152. Jone, v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev .. 390 F. Supp. 579. 583 (E.D. La. 
1974) ("court granted HUD's motion to dismiss thi~ claim because thai !o.tatute does not 
require the payment of ben eli Is to persons displaced by the sale of land to a private developer 
but only to person .. who must be relocated because the construction of new federal projects 
requires exi-:.ting structures to be removed"). 
153. See. e.g .. Young v. Harri,. 599 F.2d 870. 877-78 (8th Cir. 1979) (acquisitions of 
property by privule developer in pilrtnership wilh the city of SI. Louis are not within t~e 
scope orthe Uniform Relocation Act and "federal finuncial assistance to a privute projecllS 
ino;uflicienl to bring the project into the rCHlm of the URA "). 
154. See. e.g .. Knoxville Hous. AUlh .. lnc. v. Bush. 408 S. W.2d 407. 41 0 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
19(6) (holding that mortgage prepayment penalty is not compcn ... ab1e in an eminent domain 
proceeding becau ... e "only those damage", which are embraced within the eminent domain 
... tatme ........ uch a.., "the rca ... onablc c'l{pcn\e of removing furniture. homehold belongings. 
fhture .... equipment or muchinery made nece~sary by the taking of the property" may be 
recO\ered): Young v. Hill'borough CD" 215 So. 2d 300. 301 (Fla. 1968) ("In view of the 
express provision for bu~iness damages when a panial taking de~troys a business," dam-
ages mu,1 be awarded): Dep'l of Transp. v. Muller. 681 P.2d 1340, 1342 (Cal. 1984) 
(condemnee entitled to compensation for a loss of goodwill under CAl. elv. PROC. CODE § 
1263.510). 
155. McAlester Urban Renewal Auth. v. Cuzalina. 520 P.2d 656, 657 (Okla. 1973) 
(up.holding a \I~lIe statute that allows for the award of reasonable attorney fees in a condem-
nalion proceedmg). 
156. Id. at 659. 
157. See Tomasic V. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County, 962 P.2d 543, 559-60 (Kan. 
1998) (allowmg legislature to require "a condemning authority to make addilional payments 
beyond 'just compensation"). 
158. APA Amicus Brief, at 29. 
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159. Thomas W. Merrill.lncol1lplele Compellsatioll/orTtlkillgs. II N.Y.U. ENVTI. L.J. 




163 . Id. 
164. Scrkin. supra note 112, at 683. 
165. Id. at 687-703 (particularly relevant valuation mechanisms include: Hann Versus 
Gain: Allocating Rbk: Highest and Best Use; Timing of the Valuation ; Recharaclerizing Ihe 
Property Taken: and Replacement Va lue). 
166. Id. al 687-89 (discussing the valuation decision cOllrts must face of "whether to 
mea~ure the harm to Ihe properly owner or the gain to the government caused by the 
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